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Censorship by Crying Wolf:
Misclassifying Student and Faculty
Speech as Threats
SUSAN KRUTH*
Freedom of expression is at risk at colleges and universities across the country. While campus administrators employ a number of strategies to censor speech they disfavor,
this piece explores the trend of justifying censorship and
punishment of expression by labeling it a “threat” and citing
concerns about safety. In contrast to the kind of speech the
Supreme Court has defined as a “true threat,” the expression at issue in the cases discussed here poses no safety risk,
comprising political commentary, jokes, and pop culture references. Its punishment both trivializes actual dangers and
chills campus discourse. Accordingly, it is imperative that
students, professors, and free speech advocates work to reverse this trend and ensure institutions’ adherence to
longstanding free speech principles.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, American public colleges have demonstrated a
troubling willingness to censor student and faculty speech protected
by the First Amendment by labeling it a “threat” to the safety of the
campus community.1 The vast discrepancy between the legal standards that govern “true threats” and “intimidation” and the student
and faculty speech at issue suggests that in too many instances, public college administrators may be invoking heightened anxiety about
violence on campus to justify silencing criticism, dissent, or simply
inconvenient or unwanted expression.
While ostensibly acting to protect their community, campus administrators who claim extralegal authority to censor in the name of
safety are no more justified in doing so than those motivated by
more picayune reasons and are no less legally and morally culpable.
Indeed, given the democratic and social importance of protecting
freedom of expression in academia,2 campus censorship driven by a
1

See infra Part II.
The Supreme Court cast the essentiality of free inquiry and expression on
campus in unequivocal terms in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
2
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misguided or pretextual assessment of the “threat” presented by protected student or faculty speech is particularly harmful. To avoid
chilling campus speech, trivializing real threats, and teaching a generation of students the wrong lesson about the necessary balance between civil liberties and safety, American college administrators
must reacquaint themselves with the narrow application of the true
threat exception and respond to unwanted or disagreeable speech
with common sense and principle.
I. DEFINING “THREATS”
In American jurisprudence, the comparatively broad protection
afforded to speech by the First Amendment has certain limited exceptions, including “true threats” and “intimidation.”3 In Virginia v.
Black, the Supreme Court of the United States defined “true threats”
as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”4
In Black, the Court was careful to distinguish true threats from
protected speech like the “political hyperbole” at issue in Watts v.
United States.5 The Court also made clear in Black that the speaker
“need not actually intend to carry out the threat” in order for the
speech at issue to lose First Amendment protection.6 The Court reasoned that the speaker’s intent to fulfill the threat was less significant than the speaker’s intent to communicate the threat because of
the harm inflicted by the communication itself, reasoning that “a
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition
to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.’”7 In defining “intimidation” as “a type of true
future of our Nation. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.”).
3
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–60 (2003).
4
Id. at 359.
5
Id. In Watts, the Court found that an anti-war comment uttered at a political
rally—“If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights
is L. B. J.”—was protected by the First Amendment. See Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
6
Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
7
Id.
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threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death,” the Court similarly seemed to place primary focus not on the
speaker’s intent to actually commit an act of violence, but rather on
the speaker’s intent to instill the fear of such an act in the victim.8
The Court demonstrated the limits of the “true threats” and “intimidation” exceptions in Black, a case involving prosecutions under
a Virginia statute that declared any cross burning in public or on
another person’s property to be “prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.”9 While acknowledging that
“when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are
more powerful,”10 the Court struck down the statute’s prima facie
provision because it failed to account for the potentially transformative differences of intent presented by various instances of cross
burning.11 For example, the Virginia statute’s prima facie provision
effectively criminalized burning a cross for a stage production and
also forbade Ku Klux Klan members from burning the cross at their
rallies to communicate a message of solidarity, despite the lack of
an intent to threaten others with either form of cross burning.12 By
denying prosecutors and judges the ability to consider the context
and purpose of each individual act, the provision threatened protected expression because it “ignore[d] all of the contextual factors
that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is
intended to intimidate.”13 The Court concluded that this flaw
“chill[ed] constitutionally protected political speech because of the
possibility that a State will prosecute—and potentially convict—
somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of
what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”14
Following Black, however, federal appellate courts have reached
different conclusions about whether laws prohibiting threats must
require a speaker to possess a subjective intent to threaten. The
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Id.
Id. at 347–48.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 365.

2017]

CENSORSHIP BY CRYING WOLF

465

each found that Black does not mandate such a requirement.15 The
Ninth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion, holding in
United States v. Cassel that “only intentional threats are criminally
punishable consistently with the First Amendment.”16 The Ninth
Circuit also observed in a later case, United States v. Bagdasarian,
that “[a] statement that the speaker does not intend as a threat is afforded constitutional protection and cannot be held criminal.”17
A recent case appeared to present the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to address and resolve the conflict over Black’s requirements. In Elonis v. United States,18 the Supreme Court considered
the conviction of a man found guilty of making threats against his
ex-wife and others under a federal statute criminalizing the transmission of “any communication containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure the person of another” in interstate
commerce.19 On appeal, petitioner Anthony Douglas Elonis argued
that the Government failed to prove that he intended the Facebook
posts at issue to communicate a threat; in turn, the Government argued that no such showing was necessary.20 In reversing Elonis’
conviction, the Court’s majority, led by Chief Justice John Roberts,
rested its conclusion on the fact that Elonis was found guilty on a
jury instruction “premised solely on how his posts would be understood by a reasonable person”:
15
See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135
S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (“Black does not say that the true threats exception requires a
subjective intent to threaten.”); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th
Cir. 2012) (“A careful reading . . . does not, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion
that Black introduced a specific-intent-to-threaten requirement . . . .”); United
States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[Black] says nothing
about imposing a subjective standard on other threat-prohibiting statutes, and indeed had no occasion to do so: the Virginia law itself required subjective ‘intent.’
The problem in Black thus did not turn on subjective versus objective standards
for construing threats. It turned on overbreadth—that the statute lacked any standard at all.”); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 332 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
have adopted an objective test for determining whether a communication is a true
threat. This objective test, which has been applied repeatedly since Black, does
not consider the subjective intent of the speaker.”).
16
United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005).
17
United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011).
18
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015).
19
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
20
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.

466

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:461

The jury was instructed that the Government need
prove only that a reasonable person would regard
Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was error. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn
solely on the results of an act without considering the
defendant’s mental state. That understanding “took
deep and early root in American soil” and Congress
left it intact here: Under Section 875(c), “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”21
The Court’s decision left the question of whether a showing of
recklessness is sufficient to support a conviction under the statute
unresolved, and thus the First Amendment issues implicated by the
criminalization of threats persist.22
Despite the continuing uncertainty following Elonis, the Court’s
decision confirmed that the federal threat statute at issue “is satisfied
if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be
viewed as a threat.”23 And other decisions regarding allegedly
threatening expression prior to Black provide further illustration of
the contours of the true threat exception and the relevant factors in
ascertaining the limits of First Amendment protection.
In Watts, for example, the Court paid particular attention to the
context in which the anti-war comment was made and evaluated it
by reference to related commentary.24 Noting that the “[t]he language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and
inexact,” the Court concluded that “[t]aken in context,” the comment was simply “‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating
a political opposition to the President.’”25 The Court even granted
weight to the “expressly conditional nature” of the speaker’s formulation (if he was ever made to carry a rifle, [then] he would target
the President), as well as the reaction of those around him.26

21
22
23
24
25
26

Id. at 2011–12 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2012.
Id.
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).
Id. at 708 (approving the speaker’s own characterization of his comment).
Id.
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In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the Court observed that a
state court order prohibiting anti-abortion protesters from approaching an abortion clinic impermissibly burdened free expression in the
absence of evidence “that the protesters’ speech is independently
proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm.”27
The question of how to determine whether speech was sufficiently
“infused with violence” to justify the provision was not explored,
but the Madsen Court indicated that the expression in question must
be more than the simply “insulting, and even outrageous, speech”
that the First Amendment protects.28
In sum, Black’s formulations remain definitive for determining
when otherwise protected expression may be prohibited as a “true
threat” or intimidation.
II. CENSORSHIP BY CRYING WOLF: MISCLASSIFYING STUDENT AND
FACULTY SPEECH AS THREATS
Public college administrators consistently silence protected student and faculty speech by misclassifying expression both inside
and outside of the classroom as actionable “threats.” The examples
discussed in detail below are representative of the range of campus
censorship of speech as “threats” reported to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (“FIRE”), a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to defending student and faculty civil liberties
on American campuses.
Seemingly motivated by differing impulses—the desire to quiet
a persistent student or faculty critic, or to simply avoid negative publicity or controversy—each example involves investigation or punishment of plainly protected speech that fails to rise anywhere near
the standards for true threats and intimidation announced by the Supreme Court in Black.
While it is axiomatic that anecdotes do not constitute data,
FIRE’s case archives nevertheless demonstrate that the abuse of the
true threats doctrine by administrators at public colleges is a persistent phenomenon.29 Given the repeated documented instances of
27

Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994).
Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
29
See generally FIRE’s case archives, available at https://www.thefire.org/
cases/?limit=all.
28
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campus speech misclassified as threats, and the fact that FIRE’s
awareness of such instances is necessarily limited to those reported
by the victims or the media, it is reasonable to estimate that more
such abuses simply go unreported.
A. Hayden Barnes, Valdosta State University
In the Spring of 2007, former Valdosta State University
(“VSU”) student Hayden Barnes was expelled for posting a satirical,
cut-and-paste collage on his personal Facebook page that was
deemed a threat by the university president.30 The collage criticized
former VSU President Ronald Zaccari’s plan to spend $30 million
dollars’ worth of student fees to construct parking garages on campus.31
Barnes was a vocal critic of the parking deck’s construction in
the months prior to his expulsion in May 2007.32 He registered his
opposition in a variety of ways, posting flyers and sending emails to
Zaccari, the student newspaper, student and faculty government, and
the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.33 Barnes
proposed that Zaccari spend the money earmarked for the parking
garage on what he perceived to be more environmentally friendly
measures.34 Angered by Barnes’ persistent criticism, and embarrassed to have been contacted about Barnes’ communications by
members of the Board of Regents, Zaccari summoned Barnes to a
meeting in his office.35 Zaccari lambasted Barnes, telling him he
“could not forgive” him and asking him, “Who do you think you
are?”36 Despite the admonishment, Barnes continued to advocate
against the parking garage.37 In response, Zaccari redoubled his efforts to silence Barnes.38 Zaccari monitored Barnes’ personal Face-

30
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, Barnes
v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295 (2012) (No. 1-08-cv-00077-CAP) [hereinafter Complaint].
31
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
32
Id.
33
Complaint, supra note 30, at 3; Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1299.
34
Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1299.
35
Complaint, supra note 30, at 11–12.
36
Id. at 12.
37
Id. at 13.
38
Id. at 13–14.
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book page and seized upon the opportunity he perceived in the collage, which included pictures of Zaccari, a parking deck, and the
caption “S.A.V.E.—Zaccari Memorial Parking Garage.”39
Internal documents and depositions obtained during the course
of the subsequent civil rights litigation filed by Barnes in January
2008 indicate that Zaccari was repeatedly told by senior VSU officials that Barnes did not present a threat to himself, others, or the
campus.40 Nevertheless, Zaccari personally ordered that Barnes be
“administratively withdraw[n]” from campus—i.e., expelled.41
Barnes was notified of his expulsion by a letter slipped under his
dormitory door.42 Signed by Zaccari and attached to a print out of
Barnes’ Facebook collage, the letter informed Barnes that because
of “recent activities directed towards me by you,” including “the attached threatening document,” Barnes was “considered to present a
clear and present danger to this campus.”43 Barnes’ expulsion was
effective immediately, and if he sought readmission, he would be
required to present proof from a psychiatrist that he did not present
“a danger to [himself] or others” and to receive therapy while enrolled at VSU.44
39

Id. at 10, 13–14.
Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Over the
next two weeks, Zaccari convened no less than five meetings about Barnes. At
these meetings, Zaccari characterized Barnes’s behavior as threatening. No one
on his staff agreed with his assessment. Two mental health professionals, McMillan and the Director of the VSU counseling center, Dr. Victor Morgan, repeatedly
told Zaccari that Barnes was not a threat to himself or others. Other university
officials agreed among themselves that Zaccari was overreacting. . . . Zaccari explored several other avenues to remove Barnes from campus. These included a
mental health withdrawal and a disorderly conduct charge. VSU’s mental health
withdrawal policy requires a mental health professional to recommend that the
student be withdrawn because he or she represents a danger to himself or others.
This policy guarantees the student an informal hearing before the withdrawal and
the opportunity to present pertinent evidence on his behalf. Zaccari’s staff consistently said this policy did not apply to Barnes because he was not a threat. Zaccari also looked into bringing a disorderly conduct charge against Barnes under
the VSU Student Code of Conduct. But this charge also requires a hearing where
the student can present evidence on his behalf. Zaccari ultimately rejected these
options as too ‘cumbersome.’” (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
41
Id. at 1301.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
40

470

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:461

After being expelled, Barnes appealed the decision to the Board
of Regents for the University System of Georgia.45 Despite producing the required certification from a psychiatrist, the Board did not
reverse Barnes’ expulsion until January 17, 2008—a week after he
filed suit in federal court alleging a violation of his rights to free
speech and due process, among other claims.46 In July 2012, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Zaccari could not avail himself of qualified immunity because he ignored Barnes’ “clearly established constitutional right to notice and a hearing before being removed from
VSU.”47 In January 2015, the Eleventh Circuit again found in
Barnes’ favor, ruling that his First Amendment retaliation claim
against Zaccari had been improperly dismissed by the federal district court.48 In July 2015, the lawsuit concluded with the announcement of a $900,000 settlement payment to Barnes.49
B. Young Conservatives of Texas, Lone Star College–Tomball
In September 2008, the Young Conservatives of Texas (“YCT”),
a registered student organization at Lone Star College–Tomball in
Texas, distributed flyers during a “club rush” event where organizations recruit new student members and increase awareness of their
presence on campus.50 Adorned by the club’s logo, the flyers read:
Top Ten Gun Safety Tips
10. Always keep your gun pointed in a safe direction,
such as at a Hippy or a Communist.
9. Dumb children might get a hold of your guns and
shoot each other. If your children are dumb, put them
up for adoption to protect your guns.
45

Id.
Id. at 1301–02.
47
Id. at 1309.
48
Barnes v. Zaccari, 592 F. App’x 859, 868 (11th Cir. 2015).
49
Settlement Agreement and General Release at 2, Barnes v. Zaccari, (No.
7:12-cv-0089-HL), https://www.thefire.org/settlement-agreement-in-barnes-v-za
ccari-et-al.
50
“Top Ten Gun Safety Tips” Censored at Lone Star College in Texas,
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.thefire.
org/top-ten-gun-safety-tips-censored-at-lone-star-college-in-texas-2.
46
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8. No matter how responsible he seems, never give
your gun to a monkey
7. If guns make you nervous, drink a bottle of whiskey before heading to the range
6. While unholstering your weapon, it’s customary to
say “Excuse me while I whip this out.”
5. Don’t load your gun unless you are ready to shoot
something or are just feeling generally angry.
4. If your gun misfires, never look down the barrel to
inspect it.
3. Never us[e] your gun to pistol whip someone. That
could mar the finish.
2. No matter how excited you are about buying your
first gun, do not run around yelling “I have a gun! I
have a gun!”
1. And the most important rule of gun safety: Don’t
piss me off.
Join us for an informational meeting Monday,
September 15th at 4 p.m. in the commons area.
If you have any questions or would like to join
please contact either Rob Comer (President) at
832-372-7192 or Joshua Pantano (VP) at 281-3528088.51
Shannon Marino, the college’s program manager for student activities, informed YCT President Robert Comer that the flyers were
“inappropriate” and confiscated them.52 After Comer complained
about the violation of his expressive rights, he was invited to speak
51

Letter from Adam Kissel, Dir., Individual Rights Def. Program, to Dr. Raymond Hawkins, President, Lone Star Coll.–Tomball (Sept. 26, 2008), https://
www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-lone-star-college-tomball-president-raymondhawkins.
52
“Top Ten Gun Safety Tips” Censored at Lone Star College in Texas, supra
note 50.
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with Dean of Student Development E. Edward Albracht.53 Referencing the 2007 mass shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University (“Virginia Tech”), Albracht agreed with Marino
that the flyers were inappropriate.54 Later that week, Marino informed Comer that the college’s attorneys were reviewing the flyers
to determine if the organization would be allowed to retain official
recognition.55 She told Comer that the organization would likely be
placed on “probation” for the school year because of the flyer.56
FIRE wrote to remind the college of its First Amendment obligations, pointing out that the flyer’s text was plainly protected
speech:
Equally troubling is Albracht’s invocation of the Virginia Tech shootings as a reason to ban satirical material that refers to guns or gun violence. The First
Amendment does permit the prohibition of “true
threats,” which the Supreme Court has held are
“those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 359 (2003). The plainly unserious “Top Ten”
list expresses no such intent.57
In response, the college’s general counsel replied that “[t]he
mention of firearms and weapons on college campuses” is inherently a “material interference with the operation of the school or the
rights of others” because such language “brings fear and concern to
students, faculty and staff.”58 Continuing, he argued that “the tragedy of Virginia Tech cannot be underestimated when it comes to

53

See id.
Id.
55
See id.
56
Id.
57
Letter from Adam Kissel to Dr. Raymond Hawkins, supra note 51.
58
See E-mail from Brian S. Nelson, Gen. Counsel, Lone Star Coll. Sys. to
Adam Kissel, Dir., Individual Rights Def. Program, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Oct. 14, 2008, 11:58 PM), http://www.thefire.org/index.php/
article/9815.html.
54
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speech relating to firearms—however ‘satirical and humorous’ the
speech may be perceived by some.”59
C. Professor Francis Schmidt, Bergen Community College
In January 2014, Bergen Community College (“BCC”) professor Francis Schmidt posted a picture of his daughter in a yoga pose
on his Google+ page.60 In the picture, his daughter wears a T-shirt
emblazoned with “I will take what is mine with fire & blood,” a
phrase from the popular HBO television series “Game of
Thrones.”61 Schmidt’s post was automatically sent, via email, to
those in his Google+ “circles”—including a BCC dean, who reported it to other administrators as a possible threat.62
Following the dean’s report, Schmidt was summoned to a meeting with senior BCC administrators, including a college security officer, to explain his “threatening email.”63 Inside Higher Ed reported
that at the meeting, Schmidt was asked by BCC’s executive director
for human resources about the phrase on his daughter’s T-shirt, and,
in apparent disbelief, asked Schmidt to Google the phrase.64 When
the search returned roughly 4 million matches in reference to the
show, Schmidt asked how it could have sparked such a disproportionate response.65 In reply, the security officer told Schmidt “that
‘fire’ could be a kind of proxy for ‘AK-47s.’”66
Despite Schmidt’s explanation and the subsequent verification
of the context of the phrase via the search engine results, Schmidt
was informed in an email sent after the meeting that he was being
disciplined for the post.67 He was immediately placed on leave without pay and was required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation before
59

Id.
Greg Lukianoff, ‘Game of Thrones’ Quote Deemed Too Threatening for
NJ Community College, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/game-of-thrones-quote-dee_b_5168111.html.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Colleen Flaherty, Jersey Impasse, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 16, 2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/16/bergen-community-collegefaculty-and-president-conflict-over-many-issues.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
60
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being allowed to return to campus.68 Upon his return, BCC used the
fact of the discipline to justify placing onerous restrictions on
Schmidt’s expression moving forward.69 An official reprimand was
added to his personnel file, and Schmidt was warned that he would
be subject to “suspension and/or termination” for making “disparaging” remarks about the institution or otherwise acted in a way
BCC administrators deemed “unbecoming.”70
Schmidt’s suspension may be placed in context by reference to
his relationship to the institution.71 Schmidt was an active member
in the faculty union, which issued a vote of no-confidence in college
leadership in April 2014, following Schmidt’s discipline.72 At the
time of Schmidt’s discipline in January 2014, the faculty union had
been working without a contract for nearly six months.73 A week
before posting the photo, Schmidt had filed a grievance against the
college, complaining that he had been denied a sabbatical and alleging unfair employment practices.74 Schmidt believed he was targeted as a result of his participation in debates concerning the union
and the administration.75
FIRE issued a national press release alerting the media to
Schmidt’s ordeal76 and secured Schmidt the assistance of counsel.77
Facing the prospect of a First Amendment lawsuit, BCC cleared the
68

Id.
Victory: College Backtracks After Punishing Professor for ‘Game of
Thrones’ Picture, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Oct. 28, 2014),
https://www.thefire.org/victory-college-backtracks-punishing-professor-gamethrones-picture.
70
Id.
71
Jay Hathaway, Professor Suspended Over “Threatening” Game of
Thrones T-Shirt, GAWKER (Apr. 17, 2014), http://gawker.com/professor-suspend
ed-over-threatening-game-of-thrones-1564357810.
72
Id.
73
See Ricardo Montero-Hernandez, Editorial, My Last Letter: A Pleading
Cry for Peace, 22 THE TORCH 8 (2014).
74
Victory: College Backtracks After Punishing Professor for ‘Game of
Thrones’ Picture, supra note 69.
75
See Lukianoff, supra note 60.
76
See, e.g., Sarah McLaughlin, Bergen Administrators Fear ‘Game of
Thrones’ Quote, Censor Professor, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC.
(Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.thefire.org/bergen-administrators-fear-game-ofthrones-quote-censor-professor.
77
Victory: College Backtracks After Punishing Professor for ‘Game of
Thrones’ Picture, supra note 69.
69
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warning and reprimand from Schmidt’s file in September 2014.78 In
a letter to Schmidt, BCC admitted that Schmidt’s punishment “may
have lacked basis” and “potentially violated” the First Amendment:
“Lest there be any doubt, BCC recognizes and respects that you are
free to exercise your constitutional rights, including your right to
freedom of speech and expression, even to the extent that you may
disparage BCC and/or its officials.”79 The letter confirmed that moving forward, Schmidt would “be in good standing with BCC as if
the Incident never occurred, and BCC’s records shall so reflect.”80
D. Professor James Miller, University of Wisconsin–Stout
In September 2011, Professor James Miller of the University of
Wisconsin–Stout affixed a homemade poster near his office door.81
The poster included a picture of the actor Nathan Fillion in his role
as Captain Malcolm Reynolds in the science-fiction television series
Firefly, and a line from the character: “You don’t know me, son, so
let me explain this to you once: If I ever kill you, you’ll be awake.
You’ll be facing me. And you’ll be armed.”82
A few days after the poster was hung, Stout’s chief of police,
Lisa A. Walter, removed it and informed Miller via email that she
had done so because the text “refer[red] to killing.”83 In reply, Miller
asked that Walter “respect [his] first amendment rights,” to which
Walter responded that “the poster [could] be interpreted as a
threat.”84 Walter told Miller that he could face criminal charges for
“disorderly conduct” for reposting the poster or related posters in
the future.85
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Andy Chalk, University Threatens Criminal Charges Over “Firefly”
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Feeling challenged by Walter’s warning, Miller soon put up a
new poster on his office door.86 Marked by an image of a stick-figure police officer beating someone with a baton, the new poster
stated: “Warning: Fascism. Fascism can cause blunt head trauma
and/or violent death. Keep fascism away from children and pets.”87
Walter removed this poster as well, telling Miller via email that the
poster had been taken down for presenting a “threat,” as it “depict[ed] violence and mention[ed] violence and death.”88 Walter further informed Miller that the decision to take down the poster had
been made by the university’s “threat assessment team.”89 A dean
of the college scheduled a meeting with Miller soon thereafter to
discuss “the concerns raised by the campus threat assessment
team.”90
Concerned, Miller contacted FIRE, which in turn contacted
Stout Chancellor Charles W. Sorensen.91 FIRE explained that the
posters did not constitute a true threat, nor would they cause a reasonable person to predict a disruption of the educational environment.92 Sorensen did not reply, but instead defended Walter’s treatment of Miller in an email to all faculty and staff.93 FIRE issued a
press release expressing deep concern about the threat to free expression and academic freedom presented by the Stout administration’s failure to rectify Miller’s treatment.94 In response, many Fire-
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Letter from Adam Kissel, Vice President of Programs, Found. for Individual Rights in Educ., to Charles W. Sorensen, Chancellor, Univ. of Wis.-Stout
(Sept. 21, 2011), https://www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-uw-stout-chancellor-char
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Email from Charles W. Sorensen, Chancellor, Univ. of Wis.–Stout, to faculty and staff (Sept. 27, 2011, 4:01 PM), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-university-of-wisconsin-stout-chancellor-charles-w-sorensen-to-all-faculty-andstaff-september-27-2011.
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fly fans wrote to Sorensen to complain about the university’s actions.95 The incident attracted national media attention and statements of support from Firefly cast members and author Neil
Gaiman.96 Under scrutiny, Stout administrators announced that the
university had abandoned its case against Miller, would handle similar cases differently moving forward, and would plan First Amendment workshops to be held in the future.97
E. Professor Hyung-il Jung, University of Central Florida
In April 2013, Professor Hyung-il Jung of the University of Central Florida (“UCF”) was teaching an accounting class in preparation
for an upcoming exam.98 As the students tired of the exam review
work, the Orlando Sentinel reported that Jung stated: “This question
is very difficult. It looks like you guys are being slowly suffocated
by these questions. Am I on a killing spree or what?”99 A student in
the classroom reported the remark to UCF administrators.100
In response, Jung was placed on administrative leave in an official letter of reprimand.101 During that time, UCF informed him that
he was barred from “all . . . university duties,” was not allowed to
enter campus, and was forbidden from “contact of any nature, with
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any students, for any reason.”102 UCF further notified Jung that he
would be required to undergo a “thorough mental health evaluation”
and produce a statement from a mental health professional certifying
that he did not present a “threat to [himself] or to the university community.”103 The Sentinel reported that while UCF police investigated the “threat,” twenty of Jung’s students sent a letter to the administration complaining about Jung’s punishment and pointing out
that the statement was intended to be a joke and was generally received as such.104
FIRE wrote to UCF in Jung’s defense, making clear that his
statement did not constitute a threat and could not reasonably be
taken as such.105 Days later, UCF notified Jung that he would no
longer need to undergo a mental health evaluation.106 Jung was reinstated after three weeks.107
F. Professor Tim McGettigan, Colorado State University–Pueblo
In January 2014, Professor Tim McGettigan of Colorado State
University–Pueblo sent an email to students and faculty comparing
impending staff cuts to the Ludlow Massacre, a 1914 incident involving the massacre of striking coal miners in Ludlow, Colorado.108 McGettigan, an outspoken critic of the administration, encouraged students to protest the possibility of the loss of fifty Colorado State University (“CSU”) staffers, announced by CSU–Pueblo
President Lesley Di Mare in December 2013, and likened the impact
of the layoffs to the 1914 massacre.109
102
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In response, the administration found McGettigan in violation of
university policy prohibiting the “[u]se of electronic communications to intimidate, threaten, or harass other individuals.”110 McGettigan’s email access was immediately suspended.111 Asked by Inside
Higher Ed about the punishment, Di Mare invoked the specter of
school shootings:
Considering the lessons we’ve all learned from Columbine, Virginia Tech, and more recently Arapahoe
High School, I can only say that the security of our
students, faculty, and staff are our top priority . . .
CSU–Pueblo is facing some budget challenges right
now, which has sparked impassioned criticism and
debate across our campus community. That’s entirely appropriate, and everyone on campus—no
matter how you feel about the challenges at hand—
should be able to engage in that activity in an environment that is free of intimidation, harassment, and
threats.112
In a letter to President Di Mare, FIRE noted that McGettigan’s
email did not constitute unprotected speech and could not reasonably be deemed a threat, intimidation, or harassment.113 Even though
the institution’s general counsel responded that McGettigan’s First
Amendment rights had not been violated, McGettigan’s email access was partially restored soon thereafter.114 In January 2015,
McGettigan filed a federal lawsuit against the university, arguing
that the punishment and a subsequent revocation of a previously
110
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granted sabbatical constituted retaliation.115 The lawsuit is ongoing.116
G. Professor Chester Kulis, Oakton Community College
In May 2015, Professor Chester Kulis of Oakton Community
College (“OCC”) sent an email to colleagues and staff that read:
“Have a happy MAY DAY when workers across the world celebrate
their struggle for union rights and remember the Haymarket riot in
Chicago.”117 Kulis, an adjunct faculty member and a frequent advocate for adjunct faculty organizing, referenced the 1886 Haymarket
Riot and International Workers’ Day in part to signify his opposition
to policies enacted by OCC President Margaret B. Lee, who was one
of many OCC faculty and staff to receive the email.118 Kulis’ email
was titled “May Day – The Antidote to the Peg Lee Gala,” in reference to a forthcoming event hosted by OCC to celebrate Lee’s impending retirement.119
Days after sending the email, Philip H. Gerner III, OCC’s general counsel, sent Kulis a letter warning that any similar communications in the future would result in legal action.120 Because the Haymarket Riot “involved a bomb-throwing incident at a striking workers’ rally in Chicago which resulted in 11 deaths and more than 70
people injured,” Gerner wrote to Kulis, “[y]our reference to ‘remember the Haymarket riot’ was clearly threatening the President
that you could resort to violence against the President and the College campus.”121
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FIRE wrote OCC administrators, asking the college to disavow
the letter and rescind any threat of legal action against Kulis on the
basis of his email.122 FIRE’s letter explained:
Kulis’s brief email is entirely protected by the First
Amendment, and the charge that it was “clearly
threatening” to anyone in the OCC community is
without merit and wholly detached from our legal
system’s understanding of what constitutes a true
threat. . . . Kulis’s email invoking a historical event
in the context of his ongoing labor activism cannot
by any reasonable reading be considered threatening
or intimidating in this regard.123
Despite the clarity of the legal precedent, OCC’s lawyers reiterated their assertion that Kulis’ email constituted a true threat.124 In
response to FIRE, OCC’s attorneys claimed that because Lee was
one of the recipients of Kulis’ email, “she interpreted the communication as a threat against her personally.”125
H. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
In February 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
case of Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, leaving in place an
en banc decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit that essentially condoned the use of a broader definition of
“threat” in the context of high school students’ speech.126 The Fifth
Circuit’s decision and the Supreme Court’s failure to review and
overturn it leave students particularly vulnerable to punishment for
122
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constitutionally protected expression under the guise that it is threatening.
Bell v. Itawamba centers on a rap recording that plaintiff Taylor
Bell created and uploaded to Facebook and YouTube in January
2011.127 Bell’s lyrics alleged sexual misconduct by two coaches at
his school and contained what the Fifth Circuit described as “at least
four instances of threatening, harassing, and intimidating language
against the two coaches”:128
1. “betta watch your back / I’m a serve this nigga,
like I serve the junkies with some crack”;
2. “Run up on T-Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with
my rueger”;
3. “you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a
pistol down your mouth / Boww”; and
4. “middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga /
middle fingers up / he get no mercy nigga”.129
Bell explained in his disciplinary hearing that his intention was
to “increase awareness of the situation”—that is, the coaches’ alleged misconduct—not to threaten the coaches.130 Nevertheless, he
was suspended for seven days, banned from school functions, and
placed in an alternative school for the remaining six weeks of the
grading period.131 On appeal, the school board affirmed that Bell had
“threatened, harassed, and intimidated school employees.”132
Bell filed suit against the school board, alleging it had violated
his right to free expression under the First Amendment.133 The district court found for the school board, reasoning that because school
officials could reasonably foresee the lyrics causing disruption at
127
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Bell’s school, they could lawfully punish Bell under Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, even though the
speech occurred outside of school.134
The district court agreed with the school board that Bell’s lyrics
were threatening, but it also emphasized the idea that students’ opinions of the coaches would change in light of Bell’s allegations—thus
creating a disturbance.135 One coach “perceived that students were
wary of him,” while another “testified that his teaching style has also
been adversely affected out of fear students suspect him of inappropriate behavior.”136 In other words, the fact that Bell discussed such
serious matters of public concern effectively gave the court an excuse to avoid a careful analysis of whether Bell’s speech constitutes
a true threat under Watts and Black. This is precisely the opposite of
how First Amendment protections should apply; matters of public
concern should be, if anything, more strongly protected.137
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the lower court’s decision, acknowledging that “hyperbolic and violent language is a commonly used narrative device in rap, which
functions to convey emotion and meaning—not to make real threats
of violence.”138 The court also rejected the contention that the
coaches’ having to take special care to avoid suspicion constituted
disruption as contemplated by Tinker.139
In August 2015, however, the case was reheard by the Fifth Circuit en banc, resulting in another finding for the school board.140 The
134
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court found that “off-campus speech directed intentionally at the
school community and reasonably understood by school officials to
be threatening, harassing, and intimidating to a teacher” was not protected speech,141 that Bell intended for students to hear his rap,142
and that his lyrics constituted threats “as a layperson would understand the term.”143 It stated that it was “unnecessary to decide
whether Bell’s speech also constitute[d] a ‘true threat’ under
Watts.”144
In contrast, the dissenting judges criticized the majority’s “decision to proclaim an entirely new, content-based restriction on students’ First Amendment rights,” which applies to speech that falls
short of “true threats” but “that its invented layperson might consider ‘threatening,’ ‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating.’”145 A layperson’s
sense of what constitutes a threat—like his sense of what constitutes
obscenity or fighting words, for example—may be far broader than
what the Supreme Court has defined as punishable threats.146
While the court rests its holding on Tinker, a case involving high
school and junior high school students, many courts have erroneously extended the holdings of high school cases to college cases.147
Therefore, this intrusion into Bell’s First Amendment rights threatens freedom of expression not only for secondary school students
but also for college students, who are overwhelmingly adults and
should enjoy full First Amendment protection on public college
campuses.
I. Yik Yak, University of Mary Washington
Campus community members’ concerns over threats have
prompted a focus on anonymous speech, particularly anonymous social media like the smartphone application Yik Yak.148 In 2015, students at the University of Mary Washington (“UMW”) requested
141
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that the university attempt to block the app on campus in response
to so-called threats,149 but the context of their requests revealed a
failure to distinguish between true threats that warrant police involvement and insults that may not be punished by a public institution such as UMW.150
The controversy at UMW began in the Fall of 2014, when students posted critical and strongly worded remarks on Yik Yak in
response to advocacy by the then-president of the student group
Feminists United on Campus (“FUC”).151 In November 2014, a
small number of members of the university’s men’s rugby club were
recorded at an off-campus party singing a song with lyrics that some
found objectionable.152 Though critics of the chant characterized it
as “advocat[ing] violence against women,” the song purported to be
a cautionary tale against having sex with a dead prostitute.153 Subsequently, FUC complained about the chant to the university.154 Despite the fact that most rugby club members did not attend the party
and that most at the party were not men’s rugby club
10/22/colleges-face-new-pressure-monitor-social-media-site-yik-yak. Yik Yak
allows users to post anonymous comments, or “yaks,” and view other posts from
users in their geographical vicinity.
149
Feminists United on Campus, et al., First Amended Administrative Complaint to U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (July 20, 2015), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp-content/uploads/
sites/14/2015/10/UMWAmendedComplaint.pdf [hereinafter Administrative
Complaint].
150
See id.; see also Erin Gloria Ryan, Entire College Rugby Team Suspended
Over Recorded ‘Fuck a Whore’ Chant, JEZEBEL (Mar. 23, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://jezebel.com/entire-college-rugby-team-suspended-over-recorded-fuck-169
2488876 (“‘The University of Mary Washington is a public institution and is
therefore legally bound to respect the First Amendment rights of its students and
faculty members,’ FIRE attorney Will Creeley told me last week. ‘Exceptions to
the First Amendment are limited to a narrow subset of precisely defined categories, and the Supreme Court has made clear that there’s no First Amendment exception for speech that is simply offensive . . . .’”).
151
Administrative Complaint, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 20–21 (“[D]erogatory
Yaks were posted about ‘the feminists’ and Feminists United using insulting and
offensive words, such as ‘I fucking hate feminists and sour vaginas.’”).
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Id. at ¶ 24.
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members, UMW dissolved the entire men’s rugby club in March
2015.155 Criticism of FUC on Yik Yak and in other forums reportedly intensified thereafter.156
The university president published a statement saying that
“[u]niversity policies prohibit discrimination, harassment, threats,
and derogatory statements of any form.”157 The First Amendment
prohibits UMW from punishing statements that are simply “derogatory” with no determination that they fall into an unprotected category of speech such as true threats, but this statement set the stage
for students to demand an institutional response to constitutionally
protected speech.158
In its complaint to the Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (“OCR”),159 FUC alleged that in violation of Title IX,
UMW failed to take sufficient steps to eliminate a hostile environment created by students posting negative messages about FUC on
Yik Yak.160
FUC alleged that its members had “been threatened hundreds of
times.”161 Yet the supposedly threatening messages ranged from pop
culture references to profane but plainly protected insults—they
were not “serious expression[s] of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.”162 For example, the complaint alleged FUC members were described as “femicunts, feminazis, cunts, bitches, hoes,
and dikes.”163 One individual rhetorically asked, “Can we euthanize
whoever caused this bullshit?”164 Another referenced a sketch by
comedy troupe The Whitest Kids U’ Know, writing: “Gonna tie
155
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these feminists to the radiator and [g]rape [sic] them in the
mouth.”165
Of those in FUC’s complaint, the statement that most arguably
constitutes a true threat read: “Dandy’s about to kill a bitch . . . or
two.”166 But as in Virginia v. Black, even this statement must be
considered along with “all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether” the remark was meant to communicate a
true threat or intimidation.167
UMW declined FUC’s “request[] that the administration . . . address the problem with Yik Yak [by] having the app disabled at
UMW or banning Yik Yak from the school Wi-Fi.”168 UMW President Richard Hurley explained: “[A]s a public university, UMW is
obligated to comply with all federal laws—not just Title IX. The
First Amendment prohibits prior restraints on speech, and banning
Yik Yak is tantamount to a content-based prohibition on speech.”169
FUC then amended its complaint, arguing that Hurley’s defense of
UMW was “disparaging” and constituted prohibited retaliation.170
OCR said it would investigate the allegations in the original complaint as well as the additional allegation against Hurley.171
165
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Investigations like this incentivize institutions to take action
against students expressing themselves based on bare accusations,
with no real determination of whether the expression at issue constitutes “true threats” or other unprotected speech.
In contrast, several incidents involving actual threats via Yik
Yak on college campuses have ended in cooperation between Yik
Yak administrators and law enforcement, leading to an arrest of the
individuals making the threats. A student at Oklahoma State University, for example, was arrested in April 2015 in connection with
a “Yak” that read: “School shooting on campus this Friday. You
have been warned.”172 A former Pennsylvania State University student was sentenced in May 2015 to jail time after posting on Yik
Yak, “I am going to kill everyone in Penn State main on Monday.”173 An Emory University student was arrested in October 2015
after police concluded she posted, “I’m shooting up the school. Tomorrow. Stay in your rooms. The ones on the quad are the ones who
will go first.”174 In the same month, a Texas A&M student was arrested because he allegedly posted on Yik Yak, “THIS IS NOT A
JOKE! DON’T GO TO CAMPUS BETWEEN 7 AND 730 THIS
WILL BE MY ONLY WARNING.”175 Many more students have
been arrested on suspicion of similar threats.176
These cases stand as examples both of the kind of language that
can be punished as a true threat and of the fact that in cases where
students’ safety is truly at risk, police can obtain the information
172

Rebecca Cantrell, Oklahoma State student arrested for making ‘threats of
mass violence,’ KFOR.COM (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:22 PM), http://kfor.com/2015/
04/21/oklahoma-state-student-arrested-for-making-threats-of-mass-violence.
173
Zach Berger, Former Penn State Student Behind HUB Shooting Threat
Sentenced, STATECOLLEGE.COM (May 29, 2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.state
college.com/news/local-news/former-penn-state-student-behind-hub-shootingthreat-sentenced,1464182.
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T. Rees Shapiro, Emory University student arrested for shooting threat
posted on Yik Yak, WASH. POST: GRADE POINT (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/10/13/emory-university-student
-arrested-for-shooting-threat-posted-on-yik-yak.
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Threat, NBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015, 5:35 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/texas-m-university-student-arrested-after-yik-yak-threat-n448306.
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HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 25, 2014, 1:03 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
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necessary to take action against the perpetrator without limiting the
expression of students who have done nothing wrong.
J. Daniel Perrone, St. John’s University
In 2015, St. John’s University student Daniel Perrone wrote a
work of fiction about a school shooting for a class titled “Graduate
Fiction Workshop: The Monstrous.”177 The university reported him
to the police.178 Perrone was ultimately cleared of wrongdoing by
the New York Police Department.179 But St. John’s decision to subject a student to a police investigation and several hours of questioning, despite the fact that the work was plainly fiction within the
scope of the class and the assignment, risks chilling a substantial
amount of student speech.
A coalition of free speech organizations, led by the New York
Civil Liberties Union and including FIRE, wrote to St. John’s in
April 2016 asking the university to publish a policy that clearly protects student fiction writers from similar repercussions.180 St. John’s
had previously declined to take this step upon request from Perrone
himself.181 Without such a policy, students and faculty will be forced
to choose between avoiding all topics that might be disturbing—
even if exploring hypotheticals and made-up worlds—or potentially
being the target of a police interrogation.182 The risk of being reported simply for a serious response to a class assignment is incompatible with St. John’s assertion that it is “committed to standards
promoting speech and expression that foster the responsible exchange of ideas and opinions which enables the pursuit of
knowledge and truth.”183 Although St. John’s is not bound by the
First Amendment, it is legally and morally obligated to uphold the
177
Letter from Mariko Hirose, Senior Staff Attorney, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, et al., to Robert A. Mangione, Provost, St. John’s Univ., et al. (Apr. 6, 2016),
https://d28htnjz2elwuj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/07155652/00
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stjohns.edu/about/administrative-offices/human-resources/hr-policy-manual/
policy-1009-speech-and-expression.
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promises it makes to its students.184 The university’s response also
runs contrary to common sense and the very purpose of a fictionwriting class, particularly given that Perrone’s piece even “included
a disclaimer at the outset that its contents do not reflect the intentions
of the author.”185
The coalition letter explained to St. John’s that “[s]ome of the
greatest writings in literature, from Vladimir Nabokov to Edgar Allan Poe to Toni Morrison to Cormac McCarthy have the capacity to
be deeply disturbing.”186 Further, “because we live in difficult times
it is even more important for schools to have clear, transparent policies that respect the difference between threats to campus security
and creative writing.”187 Finally, the letter observed that “[c]reative
writing programs around the country, including those that have experienced tragedies like Virginia Tech,” have instituted policies that
properly make that distinction, allowing students to “be free to explore the various themes of our modern lives, including the truly
disturbing and tragic ones, in their creative writing without fear of a
police encounter.”188
III. PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A review of representative examples of student and faculty
speech mislabeled as threats indicates that an administrative desire
to silence criticism or opposition is a common motivation for this
type of censorship.189 Equally common are obvious misrepresentations of the content of speech at issue, or an apparent disregard for
obvious contextual factors that would mitigate the speech’s content.
184

FIRE’s Guide to Due Process and Campus Justice – Full Text, Part III:
Procedural Fairness at Private Universities, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
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At times, students, professors, and administrators have even abandoned legal, moral, and practical obligations to protect expression
in order to simply avoid discomfort.190
Whatever the cause, the problem is serious: Misclassifying protected student and faculty speech as threats threatens the First
Amendment, teaches students and faculty the wrong lesson about
their rights on campus, betrays the purpose of higher education, trivializes real harms, and produces a chilling effect on the speech of
others.
Given the fact that these misclassifications subvert applicable
legal doctrine, targeted lawsuits in defense of silenced students and
faculty may be necessary in order to reset the incentives administrators currently face. Repeated denials of qualified immunity to administrative censors in a series of lawsuits might impact the risk
management calculus undertaken by administrators, their counsel,
and institutional insurers in such a way that the protection of student
and faculty speech rights would trump other competing interests.
Moreover, such denials of qualified immunity would be especially
appropriate in cases arising out of student speech like that of Hayden
Barnes, Young Conservatives of Texas, or Daniel Perrone—speech
that could not reasonably be interpreted as “a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”191
While lawsuits may be necessary to motivate administrators at
many institutions to protect free speech, precise and carefully
crafted policies are necessary to maintain any freedoms that are
won. As demonstrated by cases like Bell v. Itawamba, though the
Supreme Court has enumerated specific categories of unprotected
speech, including threats, a layperson’s guess at what each of those
labels includes is likely not to line up with what a public institution
may legally punish under the First Amendment.192 It is not sufficient
to prohibit undefined or amorphous categories of potentially harmful expression and then rely on every current and future administrator to fairly and evenly apply school policy. Instead, college policies
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should prohibit unprotected categories of speech and define them
with boundaries that mirror those established by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, administrative efforts to censor are often
prompted or facilitated by student calls for censorship like those at
the University of Mary Washington.193 Accordingly, a critical element of minimizing overreactions to non-threatening speech is
teaching campus communities about both the legal options that already exist to address real threats and the harmful practical results
of “crying wolf.” As demonstrated by the cases where students
threatened violence on campus via Yik Yak, law enforcement is empowered to take more effective steps than campus administrators
can to keep students safe.194 After all, a suspension will not keep a
potential shooter from campus—a prison sentence will. The fact that
law enforcement is so often not called in despite supposed threats to
safety suggests that administrators’ citing to these concerns as justification for censorship is, at least in some cases, disingenuous.
Additionally, if overzealous administrators continue to punish
protected speech under the guise of responding to threats, students
will increasingly find themselves less informed about issues that are
highly relevant to them, such as Taylor Bell’s allegations of wrongdoing by his high school’s coaches. Campus community members
will not hear warnings meant to prevent history from repeating, as
all references to past tragedies will be interpreted as an intent to
reenact them—as was the case with Professors Tim McGettigan and
Chester Kulis.195 Even commemorative sentiments like “Never forget September 11th” may not be safe.
At the same time, students will be dissuaded from being outspoken on the issues that they are most passionate about, lest their
passion cross an unarticulated line determined by administrators’
whims.196 Such a result is harmful to students’ sense of civic responsibility and harmful to any well-functioning democracy. Students
will also be left without opportunities to receive professional feedback on projects that explore upsetting ideas or push the envelope
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as long as they are burdened with the fear that doing so may prompt
their institutions to react as St. John’s did, by involving the police.197
Students and professors who value students’ personal and intellectual development must demand unfettered discourse at their institutions. With moral pressure from free speech advocates and legal
and financial pressure from courts, public institutions and private
institutions that have advertised themselves as bastions of free
speech will have little choice but to uphold First Amendment principles and enact policies that allow the institution to respond effectively to true threats while fully protecting students’ rights.
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